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THE  CONSTRAINT  OF  DIGNITY: LAWRENCE  v.
TEXAS  AND  PUBLIC  MORALITY
Kristian R. Mukoski *
INTRODUCTION
The modern American political arena has sometimes resembled a battle-
field in which rival factions perennially war over so-called “social issues.”
These conflicts typically arise over activities viewed as innately immoral by a
portion of the population, encompassing issues like abortion, homosexual
acts, prostitution, polygamy, gambling, pornography, drug use, euthanasia,
and even animal cruelty.1  Often, the very legitimacy of prohibiting those
activities is in question.  One side of the conflict asserts that morality cannot
and should not be legislated, while the other side contends that the enforce-
ment of morality is a democratic prerogative.  Such disputes are framed in
terms of enforcing “public morality” or of championing “legal moralism.”
Public morality is defined as “an ethic of decency or civility (not simply rights
and liberties) which is public in the sense that it is generally acknowledged as
a requisite to the well-being of the community as such—and is therefore rec-
ognized in public policy, and (periodically at least) supported by the law.”2
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2014; Bachelor of Arts,
Political Science & International Studies, Loyola University Chicago, 2011.  I would like to
thank Professor Rick Garnett for the invaluable guidance he provided as my faculty advisor
on this topic, and for the constructive feedback he offered regarding the drafts of this
Note.  I would similarly like to thank Lauren Riley for her suggestions upon reading the
final draft of this Note, as well as the entire staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
efforts in editing the final piece.  Additionally, I would like to give special thanks to my
parents, Anastas and Nada Mukoski, for their love and support throughout this entire
ordeal (even in spite of the fact that I never fulfilled their dream of going to medical
school), and to my brother, Stefan, who distracted me when I truly needed a break from
writing.  Finally, I would like to thank my friends and colleagues for their support,
especially those who sat through the particularly titillating lunchtime discussions this topic
generated.
1 See Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. JURIS.
65, 66 (2000).  “The focal cases of public morality are those involving laws that limit certain
forms of conduct of consenting adults, on the grounds that they are morally wrong.” Id. at
65.
2 Harry M. Clor, The Death of Public Morality?, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 33, 33 (2000) (emphasis
omitted).  This ethic raises questions about “what role the political community should take
in promoting norms of morality for citizens.”  Wolfe, supra note 1, at 65.  Public morality is
concerned with safeguarding the moral well-being of individual citizens as well as promot-
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Legal moralism is the belief that it is “morally legitimate to prohibit conduct
on the ground that it is inherently immoral, even though it causes neither
harm nor offense to the actor or to others.”3  As such, legal moralism is the
jurisprudential mechanism through which public morality is enforced.
The Supreme Court seemingly resolved this dispute in Lawrence v.
Texas,4 a case adjudicating the constitutionality of a Texas statute criminaliz-
ing consensual homosexual sodomy.5  Many commentators interpreted the
opinion as adopting a libertarian approach to morals legislation, essentially
extending the constitutional rights of privacy and liberty to encompass all
“victimless” crimes.6  In his dissent, Justice Scalia echoed this belief, asserting
that precluding states from legislating on the basis of morality would poten-
tially invalidate “laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prosti-
tution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity.”7
For the most part, Justice Scalia’s vision of hedonistic bliss did not
become a reality.8  However, as the tenth anniversary of Lawrence passes, it is
important to examine the case’s impact on the enforcement of morality in
order to discern its true meaning.  This Note will proceed in four parts.  Part
I will catalogue the jurisprudential and philosophical conflict over the legiti-
macy of morals legislation.  Part II will examine the Supreme Court’s juris-
prudence regarding reproductive and sexual liberty, noting the trend towards
conflating liberty with autonomy that culminated in Lawrence v. Texas.  Part
III will closely scrutinize the characterization of liberty in Lawrence, demon-
ing a moral cultural milieu in the aggregate.  For example, drug use can be prohibited
because it causes moral harm to the user, but it can also be prohibited because the failure
to stigmatize drug use can lead to its proliferation, resulting in a culture bereft of personal
initiative and productivity. Id. at 67–68.
3 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 27
(1984) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS].
4 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5 For a review of the facts surrounding Lawrence, see infra note 111 and accompany-
ing text.
6 See infra note 117.
7 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8 See, e.g., Sarah Darville & Leah Greenbaum, Professor David Epstein Charged with Incest
with His Daughter, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.columbiaspectator
.com/2010/12/10/professor-david-epstein-charged-incest-his-daughter (describing a
Columbia University professor’s indictment for incest in the third degree after an alleged
consensual sexual relationship with his twenty-four year old daughter came to light); Jason
McLure, Maine Town is Shaken by Zumba Prostitution Scandal, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-10-17/news/sns-rt-us-usa-maine-madamebre89g1
yt-20121017_1_zumba-studio-kennebunk-police-department-zumba-class (detailing the
prosecution of a Maine fitness instructor for allegedly operating a prostitution ring out of
her studio and office); Three Indictments in Polygamist Case, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2008),
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/13/nation/na-briefs13.S6 (detailing the indict-
ment of members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints for
bigamy); Jonathan Turley, Of Lust and the Law, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2004), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62581-2004Sep4.html (recounting the post-Law-
rence prosecution of a Virginia town attorney for adultery).
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strating that it is restricted by associational and spatial limitations.  Part IV
will connect those limitations to the description of dignity Justice Kennedy
employed in Lawrence and in other cases.  This conception of dignity embod-
ies substantive values concerning the appropriate context of sexual liberty.
Indeed, though not a doctrinally perfect match, Justice Kennedy’s depiction
of dignity resembles the Catholic conception of sexual dignity: one that rec-
ognizes the worth of sexual relations in advancing love and intimacy, but one
that does not embrace total autonomy.  Consequently, the liberty interest Jus-
tice Kennedy identifies should not be interpreted as a rejection of public
morality, because his conception of liberty is premised on a substantive dig-
nity that refuses to divorce itself from morality.
I. THE GREAT DEBATE
Although such early thinkers as Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas
advocated the idea that the law could be used to create a social environment
conducive to human virtue,9  scholarly consensus suggests that the modern
debate over legal moralism began in the mid-nineteenth century.  This
debate was sparked by the publication of On Liberty, a defense of liberalism
written by the utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill.  Mill’s argument
against legal moralism was shaped by a guiding ethic known as the “harm
principle”:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collec-
tively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection.  That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant.10
The harm principle precluded state interference with individual action
unless the interests of others were impacted by that action.11  In the absence
of harm, this perspective elevated human autonomy over attenuated social
interests or paternalistic interests.12  As a result, implementation of the harm
principle would necessarily prevent the criminalization of activities deemed
harmful solely because they violated prevailing moral norms.
9 See generally ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 19–35 (1993).
10 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 70 (Michael B. Mathias ed., Pearson Longman
2007) (1859).
11 See id. at 130.
12 Mill came to this conclusion by weighing the interests of the individual against those
of society:
[N]either one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to
another human creature of ripe years that he shall not do with his life for his own
benefit what he chooses to do with it.  He is the person most interested in his own
well-being—the interest which any other person . . . can have in it is trifling com-
pared with that which he himself has; the interest which society has in him indi-
vidually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional and altogether indirect
. . . .
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In the era of strict Victorian morality, Mill’s argument was controversial,
to say the least.  Consequently, the English jurist Sir James Fitzjames Stephen
challenged the harm principle in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.  Stephen
exclaimed that Mill’s theory “would condemn every existing theory of
morals.”13  For Stephen, it was a society’s prerogative to criminalize immoral
behavior simply because it was immoral.14  He indicated that various assump-
tions regarding morality undergirded everything from contract to inheri-
tance law.15  Additionally, Stephen noted that even the criminalization of
activities that caused harm to others, such as the unwarranted use of force or
fraud, did not merely serve the sole purpose of protecting the public.
Instead, such behavior was prohibited “also for the sake of gratifying the feel-
ing of hatred—call it revenge, resentment, or what you will—which the con-
templation of such conduct excites in healthily constituted minds.”16  The
goal of prohibiting harm to others served the purpose of reflecting a moral
consensus that such behavior was intrinsically repugnant.  This perspective
was largely shaped by Stephen’s penchant for retributive justice.  He asserted
that the criminal law did not merely exist for deterrence, but also to “giv[e]
distinct shape to the feeling of anger, and a distinct satisfaction to the desire
of vengeance.”17  It was through this expressive condemnation and punish-
ment that society deterred behavior it deemed wrongful, preventing individu-
als from further indulging in degrading activities, as well as educating the
public as to prevailing social norms, thus reinforcing those norms.18
Id. at 130.  This principle obviously applied to the criminal law, but it also went beyond
criminalization, seemingly prohibiting any form of paternalistic government regulation or
even subtle social pressure.
13 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 9 (Stuart D. Warner ed.,
Liberty Fund 1993) (1873).
14 See id. at 100 (“[I]llustrations of the fact that English criminal law does recognize
morality are to be found in the fact that a considerable number of acts which need not be
specified are treated as crimes merely because they are regarded as grossly immoral.”).
15 See id. at 101–02.
16 Id. at 98.
17 Id. at 100.
18 Stephen presumed that expressive punishment for vice would be conducive to
virtue:
Persons who call debauchery wrong mean to imply that debauched persons ought
to be punished either by public opinion or by their own consciences. . . . The
sentiment of justice when moralized by the social feeling is the feeling of ven-
geance against a debauched person acting in a direction conformable to the gen-
eral good . . . .  I do not know how it is possible to express in a more emphatic way
the doctrine that public opinion ought to put a restraint upon vice, not to such
an extent merely as is necessary for definite self-protection, but generally on the
ground that vice is a bad thing from which men ought by appropriate means to
restrain each other.
Id. at 90.
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Stephen ultimately questioned Mill’s perception of society as a collection
of individuals exhibiting total separation from one another.19  Likening vice
to an infectious disease or to pollution, he recognized society’s interest in
maintaining high moral standards that were conducive to virtue.20  It was
through the criminal law that society could most emphatically condemn or
curb the spread of vice.  At the same time, Stephen believed that this need to
defend morality had to yield to privacy in some instances.21  In particular, he
cited “the internal affairs of a family” or “the relations of love or friendship”
as intimate associations for which state interference would potentially do
more harm than good.22  However, this limitation merely restrained the
scope of legal moralism—it did not negate its central premise.
The debate over legal moralism reemerged nearly a century later, when
the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution released a report
in 1954, evaluating the state of laws criminalizing homosexual conduct and
prostitution in the United Kingdom.  The report, which became generally
known as the Wolfenden Report, also suggested potential reforms to the
criminal code.  Most notably, the Committee determined that the criminal
law should play no role in the enforcement of morality:
[I]ts function, as we see it, is to preserve public order and decency, to pro-
tect the citizen from what is offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient
safeguards against exploitation and corruption of others, particularly those
who are specially vulnerable because they are young, weak in body or mind,
inexperienced, or in a state of special physical, official or economic
dependence.
It is not, in our view, the function of the law to intervene in the private
lives of citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular pattern of behaviour,
further than is necessary to carry out the purposes we have outlined.23
In proposing that consensual homosexual activity in private be
decriminalized, the Committee asserted that “[u]nless a deliberate attempt is
to be made by society . . . to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, there
must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and
crude terms, not the law’s business.”24  Similarly, with regard to prostitution,
the Committee proposed that criminal sanctions be reserved for public street
19 See id. at 86 (“It is surely a simple matter of fact that every human creature is deeply
interested not only in the conduct, but in the thoughts, feelings, and opinions of millions
of persons who stand in no other assignable relation to him than that of being his fellow-
creatures.”).
20 See id. at 93.
21 Id. at 106 (“Legislation and public opinion ought in all cases whatever scrupulously
to respect privacy . . . .  All the more intimate and delicate relations of life are of such a
nature that to submit them to unsympathetic observation . . . inflicts great pain, and may
inflict lasting moral injury.”).
22 See id. at 108.
23 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTITUTION 9–10
(1957) [hereinafter WOLFENDEN REPORT].
24 Id. at 24.
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solicitation in order to drive it from public view, rather than focusing
resources on prosecuting private acts of prostitution.25
The Wolfenden Report sparked an intellectual battle that would rage
throughout the remainder of the twentieth century.  Baron Patrick Devlin
fired the first shots in this battle with his 1959 Maccabaean Lecture in Juris-
prudence to the British Academy, the arguments of which were later refined
in The Enforcement of Morals.  Devlin premised his thesis on the belief that “it is
clear that the criminal law . . . is based upon moral principle.”26  He cited the
fact that murder and assault were illegal, regardless of the victim’s consent, to
support his proposition that the criminal law reflected certain values beyond
merely protecting individuals from unwanted coercion.27  For Devlin, moral-
ity could not be solely private because society was comprised of a “community
of ideas, not only political ideas but also ideas about the way its members
should behave and govern their lives; these latter ideas are its morals.  Every
society has a moral structure as well as a political one.”28  Widespread devia-
tions from that prevailing moral consensus would have explicitly public
consequences:
Each one of us has ideas about what is good and what is evil; they cannot be
kept private from the society in which we live.  If men and women try to
create a society in which there is no fundamental agreement about good and
evil they will fail; if, having based it on common agreement, the agreement
goes, the society will disintegrate.  For society is not something that is kept
together physically; it is held by the invisible bonds of common thought.29
Devlin envisioned majoritarian morality as the glue that held society
together, thus promoting stability.  Because societal self-preservation is the
first goal of government, it “may use the law to preserve morality in the same
way as it uses it to safeguard anything else that is essential to its existence.”30
Indeed, Devlin considered vice no more private than treason.31  Conse-
quently, he believed that society could use the criminal law to enforce moral-
25 Id. at 80.
26 PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 7 (1965).
27 See id. at 6.
28 Id. at 9.
29 Id. at 10.
30 Id. at 11.
31 Devlin exclaimed:
The suppression of vice is as much the law’s business as the suppression of subver-
sive activities; it is no more possible to define a sphere of private morality than it is
to define one of private subversive activity.  It is wrong to talk of private morality
or of the law not being concerned with immorality as such or try to set rigid
bounds to the part which the law may play in the suppression of vice.
Id. at 13–14.  Devlin illustrated the futility of the public-private distinction by using the
example of drunkenness.  If an individual chooses to overindulge in the privacy of his or
her home, it cannot be said that the activity immediately impacts the public as a whole.
However, as such behavior becomes tolerated or even destigmatized, the proportion of
private drunkards will rise, and their aggregated activity will inevitably shape the quality of
that society. See id. at 14.
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ity—a morality that would be gauged by the beliefs of the “reasonable man”
or juror.32
Devlin’s legal moralism did have limits, though.  Like Stephen, Devlin
asserted that privacy acted as a countervailing interest to public morality and
cited the existence of “a general sentiment that the right to privacy is some-
thing to be put in the balance against the enforcement of the [vice] law.”33
Furthermore, practical concerns impeded the enforcement of certain crimi-
nal sanctions.  For instance, adultery disrupted the social fabric by weakening
the institution of marriage, and fornication was frowned upon by many moral
traditions, but the criminal prohibition of either was not significantly
enforced due to the ubiquity of those activities, as well as their occurrence in
private.  The most a society could do, Devlin argued, was to enforce laws
against the worst manifestations of adultery or fornication, such as various
forms of organized commercial sex.34  Those practical considerations not-
withstanding, though, the legal enforcement of morality was not proscribed
in principle.
The legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart subsequently critiqued Devlin’s argu-
ments in a series of lectures at Stanford University.  Those lectures were even-
tually compiled in Law, Liberty, and Morality.  Hart believed that laws
criminalizing harmless consensual activities on the basis of morality
threatened to “create misery of a quite special degree.”35  This was especially
true of laws regulating sexuality, since “the suppression of sexual impulses
generally . . . affects the development or balance of the individual’s emo-
tional life, happiness, and personality.”36  Hart divided defenders of legal
moralism into two camps, represented by the “moderate” and “extreme” the-
ses.  The moderate thesis was championed by Devlin, and its premise was that
morality must be enforced because “a shared morality is the cement of soci-
ety; without it there would be aggregates of individuals but no society.”37
Consequently, legal moralism was valuable even in the absence of identifiable
harm because it prevented social disintegration and allowed communities to
preserve those shared norms.38  However, Hart was not persuaded by this
argument, noting that “no evidence is produced to show that deviation from
accepted sexual morality, even by adults in private, is something which, like
treason, threatens the existence of society.”39  Additionally, Hart believed
that Devlin conflated morality with society: a view that would necessitate soci-
etal collapse every time a society’s dominant morality evolved or changed.40
32 See id. at 15.
33 Id. at 19.
34 See id. at 22.  Today, the most prominent examples of such manifestations would
likely be prostitution, sex or “swingers” clubs, and the pornography industry.
35 H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 22 (1963).
36 See id.
37 Id. at 48.
38 See id. at 48–49.
39 Id. at 50.
40 See id. at 51–52.
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In contrast, Hart ascribed the extreme thesis to Stephen, defining that
perspective as one in which the enforcement of morality was viewed as intrin-
sically valuable, requiring no secondary effects to justify its enforcement.41
Hart found this argument equally unconvincing, asserting:
[W]here there is no harm to be prevented and no potential victim to be
protected, as is often the case where conventional sexual morality is disre-
garded, it is difficult to understand the assertion that conformity, even if
motivated merely by fear of the law’s punishment, is a value worth pursuing,
notwithstanding the misery and sacrifice of freedom which it involves.42
Hart also disputed whether a single majoritarian morality could be iden-
tified in a contemporary population.  Without any such consensus, it was
unclear whether society could legitimately punish immorality for its own
sake.43
The arguments in support of the harm principle were reevaluated by
Joel Feinberg in a four-volume treatise entitled The Moral Limits of the Crimi-
nal Law.  Unlike John Stuart Mill, Feinberg was not concerned with all forms
of social coercion that could be used to enforce the moral norms of a gov-
erning majority.44  Instead, he sought to evaluate when a criminal sanction
could become illegitimate because of a countervailing liberty interest.45  For
Feinberg, the application of liberalism to the criminal law required a “pre-
sumption . . . of liberty”:46
Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justification.
That “presumption” together with its justifying reasons we can call the “pre-
sumptive case for liberty.” . . . Suffice it to say that the person deprived of a
liberty will think of its absence as a genuine personal loss, and when we put
ourselves in his shoes we naturally share his assessment.  Moreover, loss of
liberty both in individuals and societies entails loss of flexibility and greater
vulnerability to unforeseen contingencies.  Finally, free citizens are likelier
to be highly capable and creative persons through the constant exercise of
their capacities to choose, make decisions, and assume responsibilities.47
Feinberg thus sought to balance an individual’s interest in personal lib-
erty against the necessity of coercion to achieve a particular public end.  He
concluded that only two circumstances would justify the use of legal coercion
and curtailment of freedom.  The first circumstance was the use of coercion
to prevent some form of harm to other individuals or to the public at large.48
41 Id. at 49.
42 Id. at 57.
43 See id. at 63.
44 FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 3, at 3.
45 See id. at 7.
46 Id. at 14.
47 Id. at 9.
48 Feinberg essentially reiterated Mill’s harm principle:
[I]t is legitimate for the state to prohibit conduct that causes serious private
harm, or the unreasonable risk of such harm, or harm to important public institu-
tions and practices.  In short, state interference with a citizen’s behavior tends to
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The second circumstance was the use of force when “it would probably be an
effective way of preventing serious offense (as opposed to injury or harm) to
persons other than the actor, and that it is probably a necessary means to that
end.”49  Basically, Feinberg added his “offense principle” to Mill’s harm prin-
ciple.  When taken in conjunction, these principles meant that it would be
inconsistent with liberalism for the state to criminalize an activity merely on
the basis of its perceived immorality.50
The arguments rejecting legal moralism made by Mill, Hart, and Fein-
berg were predicated on the maximization of individual liberty and diminu-
tion of individual suffering.  Essentially, they each critiqued the criminal law
under a robust theory of liberalism.  However, another claim against legal
moralism emerged: the belief that the state had a moral obligation to main-
tain neutrality among competing conceptions of “the good” by recognizing
the intrinsic value of autonomy.  Under this theory of “autonomism,” human
worth was linked to the capacity for choice rather than the object being cho-
sen.51  This left to private individuals the power to apply their own moral
preferences.  As such, the focus shifted towards arguments against legal mor-
alism based on autonomy and moral neutrality.52
In Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin perceived individual rights as
grounded in equality rather than liberty:
Government must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as
human beings who are capable of suffering and frustration . . . and acting on
intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived.  Government must
not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and
respect. . . . It must not constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen’s
conception of the good life of one group is nobler or superior to
another’s.53
The state was morally obligated to maintain neutrality in the face of
activities deemed immoral.  From this, Dworkin derived a “right to moral
independence” that was basically a right to personal autonomy.54  This right
to moral independence was an animating principle of justice that would
trump other social goods under certain circumstances.  For instance, Dwor-
kin conceded that the proliferation of pornography could corrode a social
structure that emphasized beauty and dignity in sexual relations.  However,
he believed that prohibiting the use or distribution of pornography would
be morally justified when it is reasonably necessary . . . to prevent harm or the
unreasonable risk of harm to parties other than the person interfered with.
Id. at 11.
49 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS 1
(1985) [hereinafter FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS].
50 See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDO-
ING 4 (1988) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING].
51 Clor, supra note 2, at 40–41.
52 Wolfe, supra note 1, at 88–89.
53 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272–73 (1977).
54 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 353 (1985).
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still be unjust, notwithstanding that communal interest, because it violated
the moral independence of those who sought to view or sell pornography.55
Similarly, in The Moral Criticism of Law, David A.J. Richards proposed a
“contractarian theory” of morality that he applied to the Constitution:
Moral principles are those that perfectly rational human beings, irrespective
of historical or personal age, in a hypothetical position of equal liberty and
having all knowledge and reasonable belief except that of their own per-
sonal identity, would agree to as the ultimate standards of conduct that are
applicable at large.56
Thus, morality was determined by the hypothetical consensus that would
occur if individuals could not know their future social status or identity.  By
applying this theory, Richards arrived at one of the basic moral principles of
constitutional order: the principle of greatest equal liberty.57  Under this
principle, political rights were valuable insofar as they “enabl[ed] each per-
son to pursue his or her particular ends, whatever they may be.”58  For exam-
ple, freedom of expression was important because “it support[ed] a mature
individual’s sovereign autonomy in deciding how to communicate with
others; it disfavor[ed] restrictions on communication imposed for the sake of
the distorting rigidities of the orthodox and the established . . . [and] nur-
ture[d] and sustain[ed] the self-respect of the mature person.”59  Ultimately,
civil liberties reinforced “a belief in the competent independence and integ-
rity of one’s person.”60
Through the prism of this greatest equal liberty, Richards reinterpreted
Mill’s harm principle, asserting that “the principles underlying a just criminal
law require forms of action and forbearance from action that express, on
terms fair to all, basic respect for the capacity of persons responsibly to pur-
sue their ends, whatever they are.”61  The state could not legitimately
criminalize those activities central to an individual’s self-actualization and
autonomy, obviously implicating a number of actions prohibited on the basis
of morality.  Indeed, Richards believed that individuals could rationally
55 See id. at 349.
56 DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 45 (1977) [hereinafter RICH-
ARDS, MORAL CRITICISM].
57 See id. at 50–51.
58 Id. at 46.
59 Id. at 47.
60 Id. at 48.
61 DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW 17 (1982) [hereinafter RICH-
ARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH].
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derive value and moral worth from such things as viewing pornography,62
selling sex,63 taking drugs,64 or even committing suicide.65
62 See RICHARDS, MORAL CRITICISM, supra note 56, at 71 (“[V]arious dispassionate
empirical studies show that the use of hard-core pornographic materials has a significant
and valued function in the life of many Americans.”).  Indeed, Richards argued that por-
nography could convey positive values that dissented from the prevailing conception of
sexuality:
[P]ornography can be seen as the unique medium of a vision of sexuality, a
“pornotopia”— a view of sensual delight in the erotic celebration of the body, a
concept of easy freedom without consequences, a fantasy of timelessly repetitive
indulgence.  In opposition to the Victorian view that narrowly defines proper sex-
ual function in a rigid way that is analogous to the ideas of exremental [sic] regu-
larity and moderation, pornography builds a model of plastic variety and joyful
excess in sexuality.  In opposition to the sorrowing Catholic dismissal of sexuality
as an unfortunate and spiritually superficial concomitant of propagation, pornog-
raphy affords the alternative idea of the independent status of sexuality as a
profound and shattering ecstasy.
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Because the viewing or production of pornography would consti-
tute a form of sexual expression, Richards found it “difficult to see why the pornographic
vision should not have a place in the marketplace of ideas beside other visions that cele-
brate the life of the mind, the sanctity of ascetic piety, or the usefulness of prudent self-
discipline.” Id.
63 Richards asserted that the decision to engage in prostitution could be both econom-
ically prudent and emotionally satisfying:
[I]n many cases such choices [to engage in prostitution] seem all too
rational. . . . Prostitutes have been described as the highest paid professional
women in America.  There is no evidence that prostitution itself is necessarily an
unpleasant experience for the prostitutes, or that, in general, it disables them
from engaging in other loving relationships; indeed, there is some evidence that
prostitutes, as a class, are more sexually fulfilled than other American women.
Many women have traditionally found in prostitution a useful escape from lim-
ited, oppressive, and parochial family and career lives.  Prostitution, for them, is
not adopted exclusively for economic reasons but because its urban life style
affords a kind of social and cultural variety, color, glamour, and range of possibili-
ties that would not have been available to them otherwise.
RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, supra note 61, at 113 (footnotes omitted).
64 Richards believed that the prohibition of “hard” drugs reflected a kind of moral
paternalism over the perceived addict:
[T]he psychological centrality of drug use for many young addicts in the United
States may, from the perspective of their own circumstances, not unreasonably
organize their lives and ends.  In contrast, the moral criticism implicit in the con-
cept of drug abuse fails to take seriously the perspective and circumstances of the
addict, often substituting competences and aspirations rooted in the critic’s own
background and personal aspirations to organize a self-respecting social identity,
which might only exceptionally require drug use.
Id. at 176–77.
65 Richards argued that human autonomy could demand a right to euthanasia:
Since persons have broad latitude to define the dignified meaning of their lives,
they must have, consistent therewith, the corollary right to define the meaning of
their deaths, including forms of self-willed death that are consistent with treating
persons as equals. . . . Consistent with such considerations, the concern for per-
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As time passed, those arguments against legal moralism, grounded in
liberalism and autonomism, were bound to encounter resistance from those
who felt virtue and communal values were intrinsic goods.  In Making Men
Moral, Robert George offered a defense of legal moralism grounded in
perfectionism and communitarianism.  He argued that moral norms induced
some individuals into choosing the basic goods that were fundamental to
human well-being and fulfillment.66  Civil liberties were valuable to the
extent that they helped identify and protect those basic goods.67  However,
that moral worth was purely instrumental, not intrinsic.68  For example,
George asserted that communication was instrumentally valuable insofar as it
fostered the basic human good of cooperation.  However, once that commu-
nication ceased to reinforce a basic good—like when it became indecent or
obscene—it no longer had worth.69  Similarly, privacy was instrumentally val-
uable when it facilitated basic goods like community formation, the creation
of personal identities, or cooperation.70  Yet, when privacy served no valuable
purpose, George insisted it deserved no protection, noting “[t]here is no
moral compulsion to respect the privacy of a terrorist who is building a
bomb, or a gang of thieves planning a robbery, or even parents who are abus-
ing or neglecting their children.”71
As part of guiding individuals toward virtue and well-being, societies
needed to enforce moral codes.  George identified four ways in which the law
could play a subsidiary role in making individuals moral:
(1) preventing the (further) self-corruption which follows from acting out a
choice to indulge in immoral conduct;
(2) preventing the bad example by which others are induced to emulate
such bad behavior;
(3) helping to preserve the moral ecology in which people make their mor-
ally self-constituting choices; and
(4) educating people about moral right and wrong.72
Consequently, the legal prohibition of vice played a central role in pro-
tecting individuals and communities from moral harm.73  The enforcement
of morals deterred the proliferation of vice, something that affected a com-
munity’s “moral ecology” if left unchecked:
sonal responsibility, fundamental to human rights, appears to support an affirma-
tive moral interest in encouraging persons to reflect on the kinds of
considerations, if any, that would lead them reasonably to depart life.
Id. at 249 (footnotes omitted).
66 See GEORGE, supra note 9, at 12–14.
67 See id. at 190.
68 See id. at 191.
69 See id. at 194–95.
70 See id. at 212–14.
71 Id. at 215.
72 Id. at 1.
73 See id. at 44.
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A physical environment marred by pollution jeopardizes people’s physical
health; a social environment abounding in vice threatens their moral well-
being and integrity.  A social environment in which vice abounds (and vice
might, of course, abound in subtle ways) tends to damage people’s moral
understandings and weaken their characters as it bombards them with temp-
tations to immorality.  People who sincerely desire to avoid acts and disposi-
tions which they know to be wrong may nevertheless find themselves giving
in to prevalent vices and more or less gradually being corrupted by them.74
As such, society’s interest in preserving communal virtue could justify enforc-
ing public morality.
Ultimately, this battle over the enforcement of morality consumed the
latter half of the twentieth century.  And yet, notwithstanding a formidable
effort by the defenders of public morality and legal moralism, by the time
Lawrence was handed down, it appeared as though those opposed to legal
moralism in favor of the harm principle and autonomism had largely won.75
Some believed Lawrence was merely the final nail in the coffin for public
morality.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S LIBERTY AND PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE
The decision in Lawrence v. Texas can be most easily understood as an
extension of the Supreme Court’s reproductive privacy and liberty jurispru-
dence.  Indeed, the Court cited Griswold v. Connecticut76 as “the most perti-
nent beginning point” for its analysis.77 Griswold involved a challenge to a
pair of Connecticut statutes that criminalized the use of contraceptives, as
well as serving as an accomplice to that use.78  After counseling married
couples about contraceptive use and prescribing contraception, the two
appellants were prosecuted as accessories to the use of contraceptives.79  In
striking down the statutes, Justice Douglas’s opinion announced that the
marital relationship was protected within a “zone of privacy” created by the
74 Id. at 45; see also Clor, supra note 2, at 33 (“Liberal society requires a countervailing
ethic operating to restrain the excesses of individualism and sensualism which it tends to
incite.  The point can be stated thus: an intact public morality serves two enduring social
interests—one concerning community and the other concerning character.” (emphasis
omitted)).  For example, a social environment comprised of men who frequent prostitutes
with impunity will detrimentally impact institutions integral to the public interest, like mar-
riage and the family. See Robert P. George, The Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 17,
25 (2000).
75 See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 109, 109–13 (1999) (claiming that arguments predicated on legal moralism had
become so discredited that moralists began to use the harm principle to justify prohibi-
tions on vice).
76 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
77 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
78 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
79 See id.
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penumbras formed by emanations from specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights.80
However, this conception of privacy was relatively modest, confined to
associational and spatial provinces.81  Rather than focusing on individual
autonomy, Justice Douglas emphasized that the law threatened “a maximum
destructive impact upon [the marital] relationship” by prohibiting private
use of contraceptives rather than outlawing their manufacture or sale.82
Additionally, he expressed concern over the degree of physical intrusion that
would be required to enforce such a law.83  By confining privacy to the inti-
mate association between husband and wife as well as the spatial dimensions
of the marital bedroom, the opinion in Griswold applied an older interpreta-
tion of privacy “linked to various values protected at common law—the pro-
tection of the home and of private places, preservation of the autonomy of
the family, and common law protection . . . against physical invasion of the
body.”84  The Court’s critiques implied that the primary issue was the poor fit
between the ends sought and the means used.  As several concurrences
noted, this hardly negated all criminal laws premised on morality.85
80 See id. at 484–85.
81 See John Lawrence Hill, The Constitutional Status of Morals Legislation, 98 KY. L.J. 1,
20–21 (2010) (arguing that the privacy in Griswold “was grounded on an associational con-
ception of privacy specifically limited to marital association . . . [and] also concerned the
place where the activity occurred” (emphasis omitted)); David D. Meyer, Domesticating Law-
rence, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 453, 466 (“Before Lawrence . . . [p]ersons who asserted an
interest in an accepted conception of family life, such as traditional marriage, procreation,
and childrearing, received substantial protection against state interference.”).
82 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
83 See id. at 485–86 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of mari-
tal bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?  The very idea is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”).
84 Hill, supra note 81, at 19.
85 See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498–99 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[I]t should be
said of the Court’s holding today that it in no way interferes with a State’s proper regula-
tion of sexual promiscuity or misconduct.”); id. at 505–06 (White, J., concurring) (taking
no issue with the premise that outlawing contraception could deter immoral sexual rela-
tions, but conceding that “one is rather hard[-]pressed to explain how the ban on use by
married persons in any way prevents use of such devices by persons engaging in illicit
sexual relations and thereby contributes to the State’s policy against such relationships”).
The Court’s most ardent defense of legal moralism probably came from Justice John Mar-
shal Harlan II, who also concurred in Griswold, when he authored his oft-cited dissent in
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Poe involved the same issue and litigants as Griswold,
but the suit was dismissed as non-justiciable at the time because the statute had yet to be
enforced. Id. at 508–09.  In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the Connecticut statutes
infringed the fundamental rights of married couples protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but he simultaneously defended the permissibility of morals legislation:
It is argued by appellants that the judgment, implicit in this statute—that the use
of contraceptives by married couples is immoral—is an irrational one, that in
effect it subjects them in a very important matter to the arbitrary whim of the
legislature, and that it does so for no good purpose. . . . Yet the very inclusion of
the category of morality among state concerns indicates that society is not limited
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Yet, this constrained definition of privacy gave way to a countervailing
interpretation in subsequent decades.  That interpretation began to emerge
in Eisenstadt v. Baird.86  In Eisenstadt, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts
law criminalizing the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individu-
als.87  Although the case was decided under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,88 the majority expressly extended the privacy
rationale of Griswold to the individual person rather than the married couple,
asserting that “[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.”89  By shifting its privacy analysis away from
familial relationships or spatial parameters and towards individual reproduc-
tive decision making, the Supreme Court began to conflate privacy with per-
sonal autonomy, adopting the notion that certain activities deserved
protection “because of their significance to the self, to one’s life pattern, or
to one’s sense of personal identity.”90  Essentially, the Court adopted the
in its objects to the physical well-being of the community, but has traditionally
concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people as well.  Indeed to
attempt a line between public behavior and that which is purely consensual or
solitary would be to withdraw from community concern a range of subjects with
which every society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal.  The laws
regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be used and
the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought up, as well
as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices which express
the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form a
pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any Constitu-
tional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.
Id. at 545–46 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
87 Id. at 440–41, 443.
88 Id. at 454–55.
89 Id. at 453.
90 Hill, supra note 81, at 19; see also Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of
Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1403–04 (2004) (“[T]he Court’s privacy juris-
prudence has evolved from addressing the disclosure of matters of private concern and
governmental intrusion into private spaces to a less situated or territorial notion of protect-
ing a zone of personal autonomy and decisional privacy.”).  Robert George viewed the
distinction between decisional and spatial privacy as the primary fault line in sexual privacy
jurisprudence:
Liberal advocates trade heavily on the ambiguity between “decisional” privacy and
“spatial” or “informational” privacy.  In the traditional conception of the value of,
and right to, privacy, it fundamentally concerns protected places and the control
of personal information about oneself.  Privacy thus conceived is protected by
procedural guarantees of freedom from, for example, unreasonable searches and
seizures, warrantless searches . . . , undue surveillance, wire-tapping, etc.  The
right to privacy, as traditionally understood, is not the substantive right to be
legally free to perform certain “private” acts, the immorality of those acts
notwithstanding.
GEORGE, supra note 9, at 211.
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principles of autonomism championed by Ronald Dworkin and David A.J.
Richards.
The following year, the adoption of this autonomy-based vision of pri-
vacy became readily apparent in Roe v. Wade.91  The appellant in Roe chal-
lenged a Texas statute that criminalized the acquisition of an abortion in the
absence of a threat to the life of the mother.92  In striking down that statute,
the Court grounded the right of privacy in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, asserting that the right protected “activities related
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rear-
ing and education.”93  Ultimately, in holding the abortion restrictions at
issue unconstitutional, the Court declared that the right to privacy “is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.”94
This characterization of privacy reemerged in Carey v. Population Services
International,95 a case in which the Court affirmed the unconstitutionality of a
New York law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to minors under
the age of sixteen.96  In light of “the constitutional protection of individual
autonomy in matters of childbearing,”97 the majority determined that New
York’s law could not survive strict scrutiny.98  More importantly, though, the
Court reinterpreted Griswold in light of Eisenstadt and Roe, holding that Gris-
wold stood for the proposition that “the Constitution protects individual deci-
sions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State,” thus
redefining Griswold as a case about protecting personal autonomy.99
Finally, this jurisprudential trend culminated in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,100 a case involving a challenge to five provi-
sions within Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act of 1982.101  In reaffirming
the central holding of Roe,102 the Court embraced the notion of liberty,
rather than that of privacy, grounding the concept in a strong presumption
of autonomy:
[M]atters[ ] involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these mat-
91 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
92 See id. at 117–18.
93 Id. at 152–53 (citations omitted).
94 Id. at 153.
95 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
96 See id. at 682.
97 Id. at 687.
98 See id. at 688–91.
99 Id. at 687.
100 505 U.S. 833, 952–53 (1992) (plurality opinion).
101 See id. at 844.
102 See id. at 912–13.
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ters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.103
Thus, by the time Lawrence came before the Supreme Court, autonomy-
based conceptions of privacy and liberty had been established with regard to
reproduction.
Nonetheless, a right to reproductive privacy or liberty did not necessitate
a right to sexual privacy or liberty.  This became readily apparent in Bowers v.
Hardwick,104 a case involving a challenge to a Georgia law prohibiting consen-
sual sodomy.105  In his majority opinion, Justice White framed the central
issue as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”106  Refusing to extend constitutional pri-
vacy rights to the criminalized activity, Justice White noted that “[n]o connec-
tion between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated”107 and held that
no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy existed.108  Equally important,
the majority rejected the respondent’s claim that the law failed rational basis
review because it was motivated by morality, asserting that “[t]he law . . . is
constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essen-
tially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the
courts will be very busy indeed.”109  The Bowers Court explicitly upheld
morality as a valid basis for legislation, and it refused to extend its reproduc-
tive privacy precedent to sexual freedom.110
Bowers remained good law until Lawrence v. Texas was decided in 2003.
In Lawrence, the two petitioners—John Geddes Lawrence and Tyrone Gar-
ner—challenged their prosecution under a Texas statute that criminalized
anal sex between men.111  In adjudicating that claim, Justice Kennedy’s
103 Id. at 851.
104 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
105 See id. at 187–88.
106 Id. at 190.
107 Id. at 191.
108 See id. at 192.
109 Id. at 196.
110 Bowers even appeared to limit the scope of spatial privacy recognized in Griswold.
The Court noted,
Plainly enough, otherwise illegal conduct is not always immunized whenever it
occurs in the home.  Victimless crimes, such as the possession and use of illegal
drugs, do not escape the law where they are committed at home. . . . And if
respondent’s submission is limited to the voluntary sexual conduct between con-
senting adults, it would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to
homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and
other sexual crimes even though they are committed in the home.  We are unwill-
ing to start down that road.
Id. at 195–96.
111 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562–63 (2003).
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majority opinion focused on liberty rather than privacy.112  This liberty
“extend[ed] beyond spatial bounds” and “presume[d] an autonomy of self
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct.”113  In overruling Bowers, the Court held that the liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed “two adults who, with
full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices com-
mon to a homosexual lifestyle” because “[t]he State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime.”114
Furthermore, the majority opinion seemingly addressed the very pre-
mise of legislating morality, framing the issue as “whether the majority may
use the power of the State to enforce [ethical or moral] views on the whole
society through the operation of the criminal law.”115  The answer appeared
to be a resounding “no,” as the Court declared that “the fact that the gov-
erning majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the prac-
tice.”116  With such clear language, the death of legal moralism seemed at
hand.
III. A LIMITED VISION OF LIBERTY
Following Lawrence, various commentators thought that the case would
usher in an end to the legislation of morality.117  Instead, lower courts inter-
preted Lawrence as allowing for some accommodation of public morality.118
Consequently, a reevaluation of the case’s basic import is in order.
112 See id. at 562 (“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intru-
sions into a dwelling or other private places. . . . And there are other spheres of our lives
and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence.”).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 578.
115 Id. at 571.
116 Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
117 See Sonu Bedi, Repudiating Morals Legislation: Rendering the Constitutional Right to Pri-
vacy Obsolete, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 447, 454–55 (2005) (interpreting Lawrence as a repudia-
tion of morals legislation); Bernard E. Harcourt, Forward: “You Are Entering a Gay and
Lesbian Free Zone”: On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers [Raising
Questions About Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
503, 503–04 (2004) (“[Lawrence] is the coup de grâce to legal moralism administered after a
prolonged, brutish, tedious, and debilitating struggle against liberal legalism in its various
criminal law representations.”); J. Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Criminal Law, 16 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 41, 54 (2011) (asserting that Lawrence reflects a harm principle in which “morality
is not an adequate or sufficient basis for criminalization”); Eric Tennen, Is the Constitution
in Harm’s Way? Substantive Due Process and Criminal Law, 8 BOALT J. CRIM. L. 3, 4–5 (2004)
(arguing that Lawrence concludes a long line of cases that incorporate the harm principle
in substantive criminal law).
118 See infra note 131.
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For all the discussion of liberty and autonomy, as well as Justice Ken-
nedy’s remark indicating that the preservation of morality was an insufficient
reason to uphold the Texas statute, a close reading of Lawrence reveals a
remarkable undercurrent of restraint.  As asserted by Katherine M. Franke,
“the liberty principle upon which the opinion rests is less expansive, rather
geographized, and, in the end, domesticated.  It is not the synonym of a
robust liberal concept of freedom.”119  The “domestication” to which Franke
and other commentators refer stems from Justice Kennedy’s equation of the
protected liberty interest to personal relationships, rather than to sexual rela-
tions themselves.  The criminal sexual act at issue in Lawrence was not
depicted in isolation, but rather as a component of something more
meaningful:
[T]he [Bowers] Court[ ] . . . fail[ed] to appreciate the extent of the liberty at
stake.  To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in cer-
tain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about
the right to have sexual intercourse.120
The Lawrence majority went on to declare that “[t]he statutes . . . seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recogni-
tion in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being pun-
ished as criminals.”121  Finally, the Court noted that “[w]hen sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”122
In many respects, this language parrots that of Griswold, which empha-
sized protecting the marital relationship rather than the use of contraception
itself.123  This has led some commentators to note that the liberty character-
ized by Justice Kennedy is constrained within a context marked by monog-
amy and intimacy:
Now gay men are portrayed as domesticated creatures, settling down into
marital-like relationships in which they can both cultivate and nurture
desires for exclusivity, fidelity, and longevity in place of other more explicitly
erotic desires. . . .  The price of the victory in Lawrence has been to trade
sexuality for domesticity—a high price indeed, and a difficult spot from
which to build a politics of sexuality.124
119 Franke, supra note 90, at 1401.
120 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
121 Id. (emphasis added).
122 Id. (emphasis added).
123 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.”).
124 Franke, supra note 90, at 1408–09; accord Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Roth-
man, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 820 (2010) (“[T]he language of the
[Lawrence] majority opinion suggests that sex is worthy of constitutional protection only
when it has the potential to further emotional intimacy.”); Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights Ver-
sus Queer Theory: What is Left of Sodomy After Lawrence v. Texas?, 23 SOC. TEXT 235, 239
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Essentially, the decision reconstitutes the associational privacy rationale
of Griswold by applying a “romantic rubric . . . [that] replaces marriage and
procreation with a new ground for restricting sexual conduct—the promo-
tion of emotional intimacy.”125  The Court’s assumption regarding the exis-
tence of a relationship is particularly fascinating in light of the lack of
evidence to support such an assertion.126  This may suggest a deliberate
attempt by Justice Kennedy to align his conception of liberty with prevailing
social norms.  Indeed, some lower courts have even applied this relationship
paradigm in limiting Lawrence’s reach.127
Furthermore, the “geographization” to which Professor Franke refers
adds another limitation to Justice Kennedy’s vision of liberty—a spatial con-
straint.  The majority opinion repeatedly emphasized the private nature of
the activity at issue in Lawrence, “acknowledg[ing] that adults may choose to
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private
lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”128  Additionally, after out-
lining the liberty interests used to invalidate the Texas statute, Justice Ken-
(2005) (“[Justice Kennedy’s] rhetoric leaves little or no justification for protecting less-
than-transcendental sex that is not part of an ongoing relationship.  In the end, the crucial
rhetorical limitation of Lawrence is precisely its inability, or refusal, to imagine (legitimate)
homosexual sex that does not take place in a relationship and does not connote inti-
macy.”); Mark Strasser, Monogamy, Licentiousness, Desuetude and Mere Tolerance: The Multiple
Misinterpretations of Lawrence v. Texas, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 95, 98 (2005)
(“Much of the Court’s focus in Lawrence was on same-sex relationships rather than on
same-sex relations.”).
125 See Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 124, at 825; see also id. at 827 (“Underlying
the language and rationale of Lawrence is the notion that without sex a relationship
between adults cannot reach the pinnacle of intimacy represented archetypically in the
marital bond.”).
126 See DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT 280–81 (2012) (recounting the back-
ground facts of Lawrence by interviewing the primary actors involved with the case and
ultimately determining that there was no relationship between the defendants). See gener-
ally Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756,
807 (2006) (“No doubt, one can dispute whether or not Lawrence and Garner in fact
understood their sexual encounter as part of an enduring personal bond.”); Franke, supra
note 90, at 1408 (“[T]he Court took it as given that Lawrence and Garner were in a rela-
tionship, and the fact of that relationship does important normative work in the opin-
ion.”); Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 124, at 824–25 (“The defendants in Lawrence . . .
did not hold themselves out as a couple nor is there any evidence that they intended to
pursue an ongoing relationship comparable to dating or marriage.  In fact, one of the men
was ‘romantically involved’ with another man at the time of the arrest, and it was that
romantic partner who called the police.”).
127 See infra note 131.
128 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (emphasis added); see also id. at 572
(citing “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex” (emphasis
added)); id. at 578 (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.  The
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime.” (emphasis added)).
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nedy immediately retreated by announcing a series of what appeared to be
exceptions to his holding:
The present case does not involve minors.  It does not involve persons who
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where con-
sent might not easily be refused.  It does not involve public conduct or pros-
titution.  It does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.129
Some scholars have argued that privatizing the sexual activity criminal-
ized in Lawrence reinforces societal disapproval of those physical relations.130
Additionally, various lower courts have applied these exceptions broadly in
order to uphold the prosecution of some consensual sexual activities and
even to reaffirm a state’s legitimate interest in legislating morality.131
Accordingly, a libertarian revolution in public morality has apparently failed
to take hold, partly because Justice Kennedy included associational and spa-
tial limitations in his opinion, harkening back to Griswold.132
IV. JUSTICE KENNEDY AND THE CONSTRAINT OF DIGNITY
Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion should not be read as a full-fledged
endorsement of liberalism or autonomism.  A close reading of the language
he employed in Lawrence indicates an emphasis on personal dignity rather
129 Id.
130 See, e.g., Bedi, supra note 117, at 449 (“The appeal to privacy . . . stigmatizes the act
as deviant and abnormal.  By forcing the act into the bedroom (this is the only way it can
be protected), the act becomes unworthy of public consumption.”); Franke, supra note 90,
at 1405–06 (describing a South African constitutional court case acknowledging that pri-
vacy arguments “tend[ ] to reinforce the idea that sodomy is something to be shamefully
hidden in the confines of the private bedroom”).
131 See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2005) (asserting that states could
criminalize adult consensual incest because Lawrence “did not announce . . . a fundamental
right . . . for adults to engage in all manner of consensual sexual conduct” and merely
applied to homosexual sodomy); United States v. Palfrey, 499 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40–41
(D.D.C. 2007) (holding that Lawrence did not undermine laws criminalizing prostitution
because the language of the case specifically exempted public and commercial activity
from review); State v. Van, 688 N.W.2d 600, 614–15 (Neb. 2004) (holding that an assault
prosecution stemming from sadomasochistic sexual activity did not violate Lawrence
because the existence of consent was in question); Singson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d
682, 685–86 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that prosecution for solicitation of oral sex in
public restroom did not run afoul of Lawrence due to its language excluding public sexual
activity); see also Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding a
criminal ban on the sale of sex toys by interpreting Lawrence to preclude public morality as
a government interest only with regard to private and non-commercial sexual activity, not
public or commercial activity); United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37–38
(D.D.C. 2010) (holding that prosecution for the distribution of obscenity does not violate
Lawrence because the liberty interest in that case applied to forming meaningful relation-
ships, not sexual privacy, and that morality was still a legitimate government interest with
regard to public conduct like the dissemination of obscenity).
132 See Strasser, supra note 124, at 98–99 (arguing that the Court used these limitations
to place Lawrence in the same strand of substantive due process as Griswold).
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than on sexual liberty or autonomy.133  Justice Kennedy repeatedly con-
nected the liberty interest in that case to the dignity of the defendants.134
Essentially, preserving the liberty of Lawrence and Garner was instrumental
in maintaining their dignity.
“Dignity” is defined as “the quality or state of being worthy.”135  As
Neomi Rao explained in Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, “dig-
nity” also tends to be an ambiguous legal concept.136  Rao identified three
versions of dignity that courts apply in constitutional opinions.  One form of
dignity is derived from the intrinsic worth and personhood of the individual,
and it applies equally to all human beings.137  This “inherent dignity,” espe-
cially popular in United States constitutional law, is usually related to nega-
tive rights that “support[ ] individual autonomy and freedom from state
interference.”138  It is protected by allowing human beings to make
uncoerced choices that affect their destiny.139  Due to the need to respect
autonomy, this conception of dignity must remain neutral and pluralistic,
providing no substantive value judgment as to what constitutes “the good.”140
As such, inherent dignity is intertwined with the jurisprudential theories
espoused by Dworkin and Richards.  Another version of dignity Rao identi-
fied is “dignity as recognition,” stemming from a “desire to be recognized, to
have the political and social community acknowledge and respect one’s per-
sonality and dignity.”141  Here, an individual’s worth is determined by the
extent to which that person is accepted by his or her community.  This vision
of dignity demands not only equal treatment of individuals by the state, but
treatment that recognizes the worth of individuals and their choices.142
Rao concluded that both inherent dignity and dignity as recognition
were invoked in the Lawrence opinion.143  However, when Justice Kennedy’s
references to dignity are viewed in light of his constrained depiction of sex-
ual liberty, it becomes apparent that a third variation of dignity was in play.
Rao referred to this as “substantive” or “positive” dignity:
133 See Francis Curren ed., Sexual Privacy After Lawrence v. Texas, 12 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 333, 336–37 (2011).
134 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (“It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may
choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private
lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.” (emphasis added)); id. at 578 (“The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.  The State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.” (empha-
sis added)).
135 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 632 (1961).
136 See Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
183, 186 (2011).
137 See id. at 196–99.
138 Id. at 203.
139 See id. at 203–04.
140 See id. at 205.
141 Id. at 243.
142 See id. at 249.
143 See id. at 212, 257.
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By contrast to inherent or intrinsic dignity, positive conceptions of dignity
promote substantive judgments about the good life.  Dignity here stands for
what is valuable for individuals and society at large.  Constitutional courts
sometimes use this conception of dignity to justify political constraints and
to promote values such as community or public morality.  In this line of rea-
soning, a “proper” conception of dignity means guiding the individual and
society toward particular dignified choices.  These forms of dignity will often
conflict with the dignity of the autonomous individual.144
Such dignity is expressly communitarian and contingent on social norms
rather than the desires or choices of individuals.145  An individual may gain
or lose dignity depending on the degree of conformity to a particular com-
munal virtue.146  Indeed, Rao noted that consent to partake in an undigni-
fied activity was immaterial, citing instances in which courts justified criminal
sanctions regarding obscenity and prostitution in order to protect individuals
from making the poor and degrading choice of producing pornography or
engaging in prostitution.147  Thus, this substantive dignity is definitively
paternalistic and even potentially coercive.
As explained above, Justice Kennedy depicted sexual activity as legiti-
mate and worthy of constitutional protection only when it was undertaken in
private and when it furthered emotional intimacy or romance.  This in and of
itself reflected a moral judgment about the proper context of sexual relations
and thereby connected sexual activity to substantive dignity.  By equating the
sexual relationship of the defendants to that of a married couple, Justice
Kennedy implied that the sexual acts in question derived their worth from
their marital-esque context and that sexual relations were dignified as long as
they were private, intimate, and monogamous—essentially confined within
associational and spatial boundaries.  Consequently, Justice Kennedy was crit-
icized by some commentators for establishing a sexual paradigm that was
144 Id. at 221.
145 See id. at 222.
146 See id. at 224.
147 See id. at 228–29.  Although Rao cites Canadian cases to exemplify the use of sub-
stantive dignity to restrict prostitution and pornography, a similar phenomenon occurred
in some United States Supreme Court cases addressing obscenity.  For instance, in Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), Chief Justice Burger invoked substantive dig-
nity as a rationale for restricting obscenity:
If we accept the unprovable assumption that a complete education requires the
reading of certain books, and the well nigh universal belief that good books,
plays, and art lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and
develop character, can we then say that a state legislature may not act on the
corollary assumption that commerce in obscene books, or public exhibitions
focused on obscene conduct, have a tendency to exert a corrupting or debasing
impact leading to antisocial behavior? . . . The sum of experience . . . affords an
ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of
human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development
of human personality, can be debased and distorted by crass commercial exploita-
tion of sex.
Id. at 63 (citations omitted).
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bourgeois and heteronormative.148  To them, his opinion stood for the pro-
position that “[t]he Court, and the Constitution, will respect . . . sex lives, but
on condition that [those] sex lives be respectable.”149
Nonetheless, Lawrence was not the first time that Justice Kennedy
invoked or agreed with a paternalistic or substantive form of dignity.  For
instance, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in
Washington v. Glucksberg.150  In that case, the Court rejected a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to a Washington law that made assisting suicide a
crime.151  The respondents asserted that the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment encompassed the individual decision to die with dignity,
hence explicitly conflating dignity with autonomy.152  However, the Court
rejected this perspective.  It held that Washington had a legitimate interest in
criminalizing assisted suicide in order to preserve human life literally and
symbolically,153 to protect “the integrity and ethics of the medical profes-
sion,”154 and to protect vulnerable populations like the terminally ill or dis-
abled.155  Viewed in another light, the decision can be understood as
preserving the dignity of human life, the dignity of medical professionals, the
dignity of the physician-patient relationship, and the dignity of sick or dis-
abled individuals.  Each of the interests the Court listed embodied a substan-
tive value judgment that ultimately outweighed autonomy in the name of a
public good, affirming principles broader than mere harm to non-con-
senting parties.
Similarly, Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in Gonzales v.
Carhart,156 a post–Lawrence case that addressed the constitutionality of the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.157  In upholding the law, Justice Ken-
nedy emphasized the gruesome nature of the procedure, known as intact
dilation and evacuation, in which a fetus is delivered until its head is lodged
in the cervix, at which point its skull is pierced with scissors or crushed with
forceps.158  In light of the procedure’s similarity to infanticide, Justice Ken-
nedy asserted that Congress had a legitimate interest in outlawing the proce-
148 See, e.g., Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 124, at 839 (“The sex-in-service-to-inti-
macy model . . . can harm individuals living both within and outside of coupled intimacy by
sustaining the current systems of gender and heteronormativity[,] . . . producing shame
and guilt about desires and practices that do not conform to the state’s vision of appropri-
ate sex . . . .”).  Rosenbury and Rothman specifically cite casual sex with multiple partners
or the “one-night stand[ ]” as examples of sexual activity that would fall outside of Justice
Kennedy’s paradigm. Id. at 838.
149 Ruskola, supra note 124, at 239.
150 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
151 See id. at 705–06.
152 See id. at 726.
153 See id. at 728–29.
154 Id. at 731.
155 See id. at 731–32.
156 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
157 See id. at 132.
158 See id. at 151.
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dure to prevent the coarsening of society’s approach to the value of human
life, as well as to distinguish abortion from infanticide.159  Furthermore, Jus-
tice Kennedy noted that Congress had a legitimate interest in protecting the
mother-child relationship by apprising the mother of the gravity of the proce-
dure she sought.160  Once again, the Court applied a value judgment, opting
to weigh the dignity of potential human life and the dignity of motherhood
over personal autonomy, thus invoking a substantive conception of
dignity.161
The substantive dignity Justice Kennedy associated with sexual relations
in Lawrence cannot be separated from morality.  His view of sexuality con-
fined to monogamous relationships and private spaces is similar to the view
of legal moralists who argue that the dignity of sexual relationships should be
protected from disconnecting the sexual act from love or intimacy.162  Fur-
thermore, although Catholicism deems same-sex sexual activity to be
immoral, Justice Kennedy’s broader view regarding the dignity of the sexual
act could even be characterized as embodying distinctly Catholic over-
tones.163  Consequently, it cannot be argued that the decision in Lawrence
reflected an end to legal moralism.  Justice Kennedy’s direct application of a
paternalistic and substantive version of dignity to sexual relations directly
undermines the central premises of the liberalism advocated by Mill, Hart,
and Feinberg, as well as the autonomism supported by Dworkin and Rich-
159 See id. at 157–58.
160 See id. at 159.
161 Indeed, in her Carhart dissent, Justice Ginsburg asserted that the majority based its
opinion on “moral concerns”—something that she argued was explicitly barred by Law-
rence. See id. at 182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
162 See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 9, at 99 (“The human interest in dignity and beauty in
sexual relationships, and in the creation and maintenance of a ‘cultural structure’ which
supports these goods, is a ‘collective’ interest . . . .”); Clor, supra note 2, at 36–37 (“The
traditional public morality that condemns the pornographic is part of an ethos associating
sexuality with love or affection—or, at least, regarding it as a relation among persons, not
just between bodies.  So it labels as indecent the depersonalization, and hence dehumani-
zation, of erotic life and its participants.”).
163 In his encyclical Evangelium Vitae, Pope John Paul II warned that a vision of freedom
separated from tradition and authority would devolve into relativism, resulting in society
“becom[ing] a mass of individuals placed side by side, but without any mutual bonds.”
JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE ¶ 20 (1995).  This would ultimately result in a depersonal-
ized sexuality devoid of all love:
Within this same cultural climate, the body is no longer perceived as a properly
personal reality, a sign and place of relations with others, with God and with the
world.  It is reduced to pure materiality: it is simply a complex of organs, func-
tions and energies to be used according to the sole criteria of pleasure and effi-
ciency.  Consequently, sexuality too is depersonalized and exploited: from being
the sign, place and language of love, that is, of the gift of self and acceptance of
another, . . . it increasingly becomes the occasion and instrument for self-asser-
tion and the selfish satisfaction of personal desires and instincts.  Thus the origi-
nal import of human sexuality is distorted and falsified . . . .
Id. ¶ 23.
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ards.  Since Justice Kennedy invoked a liberty interest more grounded in the
associational and spatial privacy of Griswold than the personal autonomy of
Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey, the advancement of unimpeded liberty or auton-
omy in all matters of sexual gratification cannot be the primary intent of his
Lawrence opinion.  Instead, Justice Kennedy seemed far more concerned with
the creation of a safe space in which same-sex couples could strengthen their
emotional bonds and love.  Permitting a degree of sexual freedom is merely
instrumental in achieving those ends.  This is not necessarily at odds with
legal moralism or the advancement of public morality.  As explained in Part
I, legal moralists like Stephen, Devlin, and George each recognized that the
enforcement of public morality had to allow a degree of privacy in order to
protect certain intimate relationships.164  As social norms change, the deter-
mination of which relationships are worthy of that protection will change as
well.  Perhaps Lawrence merely reflected that change.
Consequently, notwithstanding Justice Kennedy’s statement regarding
the impropriety of enforcing morality, nothing in the liberty interest he char-
acterized precludes the enforcement of public morality.  Due to his emphasis
on substantive dignity, Justice Kennedy’s invocation of liberty is incompatible
with liberalism and autonomism because it imposes associational and spatial
constraints on sexual activity that go beyond mere avoidance of harm, and it
embodies a distinct value judgment as to the appropriate context of sexual
activity independent of individual choice.
CONCLUSION
Of the great philosophical and jurisprudential struggles that have
emerged over the past few centuries, perhaps none has raised such passion-
ate debate as the one created by the tension between the rights of the individ-
ual and the dictates of a communal morality.  After the Supreme Court
struck down a Texas statute prohibiting private and consensual homosexual
sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas, some believed that the enforcement of public
morality was no longer a legitimate state interest.  And yet, to the disappoint-
ment of many civil libertarians, Lawrence did not result in the national legali-
zation of drug possession, prostitution, or other “victimless” crimes, nor did it
result in the nullification of all laws justified on the basis of public morality.
Instead, it appears as though its general effect was narrowly confined to the
legal struggles over gay rights.
This Note argues that Lawrence’s limited impact on the legislation of
public morality should not have been surprising, because the case never
stood for the proposition that morality could not be legislated.  When the
values underlying the decision are examined, it becomes clear that the liberty
interest Justice Kennedy invoked was one in which sexual activity was
restricted by associational and spatial limitations.  Most importantly, Justice
Kennedy tied this liberty to a substantive vision of dignity present in other
opinions written and joined by Justice Kennedy.  This substantive dignity
164 See supra notes 21, 33, 70, and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-1\NDL110.txt unknown Seq: 27 14-NOV-13 12:05
2013] the  constraint  of  dignity 477
reflects a moral paternalism that conflicts with the liberalism and autonom-
ism championed by civil libertarians.  Ultimately, Justice Kennedy’s opinion
recognized the value of sexual relations in private as a means of furthering
emotional intimacy and partnership, rather than deeming sexual liberty as
valuable in itself.  This value judgment was effectively the expression of a
moral judgment regarding the appropriate context for sexual relations, so it
could not serve as a categorical indictment of morals legislation.  Regardless
of the way courts will interpret Lawrence in the future, though, one thing is
certain: the debate over legislating morality is unlikely to go away anytime
soon.
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